Trustworthy Whole-System Provenance for the Linux Kernel

Adam Bates, Dave Tian, Kevin R.B. Butler, and Thomas Moyer.
24th USENIX Security Symposium (Security'15).
Washington D.C., USA. August 13, 2015.
(acceptance rate=15.7%)
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Abstract

In a provenance-aware system, mechanisms gather and report metadata that describes the history of each object being processed on the system, allowing users to understand how data objects came to exist in their present state. However, while past work has demonstrated the usefulness of provenance, less attention has been given to securing provenance-aware systems. Provenance itself is a ripe attack vector, and its authenticity and integrity must be guaranteed before it can be put to use.

We present Linux Provenance Modules (LPM), the first general framework for the development of provenance-aware systems. We demonstrate that LPM creates a trusted provenance-aware execution environment, collecting complete whole-system provenance while imposing as little as 2.7% performance overhead on normal system operation. LPM introduces new mechanisms for secure provenance layering and authenticated communication between provenance-aware hosts, and also interoperates with existing mechanisms to provide strong security assurances. To demonstrate the potential uses of LPM, we design a Provenance-Based Data Loss Prevention (PB-DLP) system. We implement PBDLP as a file transfer application that blocks the transmission of files derived from sensitive ancestors while imposing just tens of milliseconds overhead. LPM is the first step towards widespread deployment of trustworthy provenance-aware applications.