Abstract

Auditing, a central pillar of operating system se- curity, has only recently come into its own as an active area of public research. This resurgent interest is due in large part to the notion of data provenance, a technique that iteratively parses audit log entries into a dependency graph that explains the history of system execution. Provenance facilitates precise threat detection and investigation through causal analysis of sophisticated intrusion behaviors. However, the absence of a foundational audit literature, combined with the rapid publication of recent findings, makes it difficult to gain a holistic picture of advancements and open challenges in the area.

In this work, we survey and categorize the provenance-based system auditing literature, distilling contributions into a layered taxonomy based on the audit log capture and analysis pipeline. Recognizing that the Reduction Layer remains a key obstacle to the further proliferation of causal analysis technologies, we delve further on this issue by conducting an ambitious independent evaluation of 8 exemplar reduction techniques against the recently-released DARPA Transparent Computing datasets. Our experiments uncover that past approaches frequently prune an overlapping set of activities from audit logs, reducing the synergistic benefits from applying them in tandem; further, we observe an inverse relation between storage efficiency and anomaly detection performance. However, we also observe that log reduction techniques are able to synergize effectively with data compression, potentially reducing log retention costs by mul- tiple orders of magnitude. We conclude by discussing promising future directions for the field.